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Semantic Inferentialism and the Evolutionary
Argument Against Naturalism
1 The Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism
Alvin Plantinga's evolutionary argument against naturalism (EAAN)1 seeks to estab-
lish that the naturalist who accepts evolutionary theory is committed to a pernicious
and encompassing scepticism regarding the reliability of her cognitive faculties. The
argument is distinctly epistemological in character; Plantinga's goal is not to show
that there is some metaphysical incompatibility between naturalism and evolution,
but rather, as Plantinga sometimes puts it, that the conjunction of naturalism and
evolution cannot be rationally believed.
`Naturalism', as Plantinga understands that term, is the claim that `there is no
such person as God, or anything at all like him' [Plantinga 2008: 19]. Naturalists,
needless to say, reject the notion that God, or some other non-natural person, has so
orchestrated the course of evolution so as to culminate in the existence of creatures
made in his image as persons capable of knowledge. As unattractive as the invocation
of divine providence will be to naturalists, Plantinga's claim is that something of this
sort is necessary if we are to avoid committing ourselves to scepticism. Without this
kind of guidance, so the thought goes, there is no reason that creatures who form
beliefs will be so constituted as to form true beliefs, and hence in all probability they
will not reliably form true beliefs. I will present the EAAN and provide a survey of a
theory of meaning known as semantic inferentialism. I will argue that if one accepts
semantic inferentialism then Plantinga's motivation for the EAAN is undermined.
Why think that without invoking divine guidance we are unjustied in taking our
beliefs to be reliable? Plantinga begins by considering materialist naturalism. On ma-
terialism beliefs either are or supervene upon neuro-physiological properties or events
(henceforth `NP properties' or `NP events'). The rst claim is one of identity between
NP properties or events and beliefs; beliefs reduce to NP properties or events. The
latter is a nonreductive form of materialism in which there are two kinds of prop-
erties, mental and non-mental, but mental properties are determined by or strongly
supervene upon non-mental ones. If beliefs are or supervene upon NP properties and
events, then those NP properties and events that constitute beliefs will have contents.2
A content C is determined by an NP property or event, or, more likely, some Boolean
combination of NP properties or events, for instance:
(P1 &P5 &P98 &...) _ (P7 &P12 &P33 &) _ (P2 &P3 &P427 &) _ ...
where Pi are NP properties. At some critical level of complexity, NP structures come
to constitute beliefs or the supervenience base for beliefs, and, hence, at this critical
level of complexity NP structures come to determine contents. On materialism then
NP structures are responsible for two distinct things: on the one hand they determine
1
mental contents, on the other hand they cause behaviours. Given processes of natural
selection, NP structures that cause adaptive behaviour are selected for, and it is
these NP structures that determine contents in extant creatures, but, crucially, what
contents these structures determine is simply irrelevant to their adaptiveness. As
Patricia Churchland has famously noted,
Boiled down to essentials, a nervous system enable the organism to succeed
in the four Fs: feeding, eeing, ghting and reproducing. The principle
chore of nervous systems is to get the body parts where they should be
in order that the organism may survive. ... Truth, whatever that is,
denitely takes the hindmost. [Churchland 1987: 548-9]
One can think of this in terms of the existence of a function f : NP 7! C from Boolean
combinations of suciently complex NP properties to contents. In everyday thinking
one usually supposes that this function will preserve the relations we ordinarily take
to obtain between the content of a belief and its role in behaviour. So, for instance,
beliefs whose content is about the location of food, combined with a desire to eat
will ordinarily issue in appropriate actions such as moving to the location of the
food. However, given materialist-naturalism, there is no a priori guarantee that these
relations will obtain. Moreover, evolution provides no reason to alter this assessment,
for NP structures are selected for because of their causal ecacy, not because of the
contents they determine. True beliefs are not selected for, rather, causal roles are,
and there is no reason on this picture to think that the connection between causal
role and belief content is anything but arbitrary:
Granted, the structure in question helps cause adaptive behavior. But
that doesn't so much as slyly suggest that the content that gets associ-
ated with the structure is true. As far as its causing the right kind of
behavior is concerned, it simply doesn't matter whether the content, that
associated proposition, is true or false. At this point, as far as the truth
or falsehood of the content that arises, natural selection just has to take
potluck. (Not that it minds|it's interested, so to speak, just in adaptive
behavior, not in true belief.) ... Given naturalism, it would be sheer coin-
cidence, an enormous cosmic serendipity, if the content that is associated
with adaptively useful NP properties should also turn out to be all or
mostly true content. [Plantinga 2008: 40]
As there is no more reason to think any given belief true rather than false, Plantinga
suggests taking the probability of any given belief being true as being .5. Given
this, the probability that, for 1000 independent beliefs, at least three quarters of
them were true would be less than 10 58. At any reasonable measure of reliability,
such a creature could not be said to have reliable belief-forming faculties, hence the
probability that one's cognitive faculties are reliable given naturalism and evolution
is low. In symbols:
P(R/N&E) is low
where R is the proposition that our belief-forming faculties are reliable, N the propo-
sition that naturalism is true, and E the proposition that evolutionary theory is true.
The second step in the EAAN is the claim that a person who accepts naturalism
and evolutionary theory and comes to see that P(R/N&E) is low, acquires, by means
of that recognition, a defeater for R|viz. she comes to acquire a belief that, by
virtue of holding it, precludes rationally believing R. By analogy, Plantinga imagines
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a drug XX that is known to render cognitive faculties unreliable in 95 percent of those
who ingest it. For these 95 percent, ingesting XX results in their believing more false
propositions than true. Say that you come to believe that you have ingested the drug;
it seems clear that you have a defeater for the belief that your cognitive faculties are
reliable.
Three points are in order here. Firstly, because R involves all of one's cognitive
faculties, one cannot appeal to the deliverances of those faculties, or some subset of
one's faculties, to deect the defeater, for this involves relying on the very faculties
that are impugned. Secondly, and relatedly, anyone who has a defeater for R thereby
has a defeater for any belief that is a deliverance of R, which is to say all of one's
beliefs. This includes the conjunction of naturalism and evolution. Finally, because
commitment to N&E entails commitment to a defeater for N&E, N&E is self-defeating.
Plantinga decomposes the EAAN into four steps:
(1) P(R/N&E) is low.
(2) Anyone who accepts N&E and comes to see that P(R/N&E) is low
has a defeater for R.
(3) Anyone who has a defeater for R has a defeater for all her beliefs
(including N&E).
(4) Since commitment to N&E entails commitment to a defeater to N&E,
N&E is self-defeating and cannot be rationally believed.
(1) is a consequence of Plantinga's claim that we should estimate the probability of
any given belief being true (given naturalism and evolution) as being .5. We will call
this claim (1*):
(1*) Given naturalism and evolution, it is no more probable that, for any
adaptive belief, it will be true rather than false.
This in turn is motivated by a further claim:
[S]uppose materialism were true: then [i]t is by virtue of the NP proper-
ties, however, not the content, that the belief causes what it does cause.
... It isnt by virtue of the content of this belief; the content of the belief
is irrelevant to the causal power of the belief with respect to behaviour.
[Plantinga 2012: 268].
We will call this claim (1**):
(1**) Given naturalism and evolution, the probability that there is a
non-arbitrary connection between the content of a belief and its role,
is low.
It is the contention of this paper that semantic inferentialism, if true, would undermine
(1**). In what follows we will see why this is so, and assess its bearing on the EAAN.
2 Responding to the EAAN
There are, broadly speaking, two ways in which the EAAN has been challenged.
The rst is to deny that knowing that P(R/N&E) is low constitutes a defeater for
naturalism. The second is to deny premiss (1), that P(R/N&E) is low. It is this second
option that we shall explore here. Any cogent response to (1) must then involve a
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theory of content in which there is some principled connection between the behaviours
caused by an NP structure and the content of the belief that structure determines.
This alone will hardly be sucient however, for the function from behaviours to
contents may be such that, although principled, associates mainly false beliefs with
adaptive behaviours. In addition to linking behaviour to belief content then, the
theory must do so in a way that links specically adaptive behaviour to true contents.
Robustly empiricist theories of mental content, such as Dretske's indicator seman-
tics3 and Millikan's teleosemantics4 are one such attempt to forge a link between the
adaptiveness of a behaviour and its content. Plantinga [2011] discusses these else-
where, but they are not the only semantic theories that seek to establish a principled
connection between the content of a belief and its role in action. Semantic infer-
entialism (SI) is another such theory, one that poses a more dicult challenge to
the EAAN. SI, as it is developed by its most prominent expositor Robert Brandom,
involves an incredibly wide-ranging and multifaceted network of claims. Luckily, for
our purposes, it will suce to survey its most general features.
2.1 Semantic Inferentialism
The EAAN pertains to the content of beliefs, but what makes a belief a belief and
what makes a belief have a particular content? A trained parrot's reliable disposition
to respond dierentially to red stimuli by squawking \Red!" is not sucient for it
to have a true belief about the colour of the objects it is reliably responding to nor
indeed for it to have a belief at all|even if it supercially resembles believing creatures
in some respects. What missing ingredient then is required to elevate the creature
that reliably dierentially responds to various stimuli to a creature that has beliefs
regarding the stimuli to which it responds? One answer begins by noting that the
parrot lacks comprehension: it has no mastery, no understanding of redness; it lacks
the concept red. This is aright as far as it goes, but we have so far only succeeded
in giving a series of labels to the parrot's deciencies. If we are to understand what
it is lacking, we must somehow unpack the consanguineous notions of comprehension,
understanding and concept possession. SI is, at its core, an attempt to do just this.
Robert Brandom provides the canonical statement of the view:
To grasp or understand a concept is ... to have practical mastery over the
inferences it is involved in|to know, in the practical sense of being able
to distinguish, what follows from the applicability of a concept and what
it follows from. The parrot does not treat \That's red" as incompatible
with \That's green," nor as following from \That's scarlet" and entailing
\That's colored." Insofar as the repeatable response is not, for the par-
rot, caught up in practical proprieties of inference and justication, and
so of the making of further judgements, it is not a conceptual or cogni-
tive matter at all. What the parrot and measuring instrument lack is an
appreciation of the signicance their response has as a reason for mak-
ing further claims and acquiring further beliefs, its role in justifying some
further attitudes and performances and ruling out others. Concepts are
essentially inferentially articulated. Grasping them in practice is knowing
one's way around the proprieties of inference and incompatibility they are
caught up in. What makes a classication deserve to be called conceptual
classication is its inferential role. [Brandom 1994: 89]
Whereas broadly Tarskian approaches to semantics give explanatory privilege to
truth conditions, take comprehension to consist in `grasping truth conditions' and go
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on to explain inference in terms of truth conditions, SI begins with a basic notion
of inference and uses it to do its explanatory work. According to the semantic in-
ferentialist picture it is impossible for a creature to possess a lone belief. Grasping
a concept requires a practical mastery of its inferential relations to other concepts|
what it follows from, what follows from it, what it precludes and what precludes it.
To grasp one concept, a creature must grasp many. As Brandom puts it, `Cognitively,
the grasp of one concept is the sound of one hand clapping' [Brandom 2000: 49].
Brandom, following Wilfred Sellars' usage, calls the kinds of inferences that make
up the content of a concept material inferences. Material inferences are those in-
ferences that are licensed by virtue of the content of the concepts involved in the
inference. From \Glasgow is west of Edinburgh" one can infer \Edinburgh is east
of Glasgow", from \The paint is red (and monochromatic)" that \The paint is not
green", or from \It is raining outside" that \The ground will be wet". Grasping a
concept involves a practical mastery of the material inferences it is implicated in, an
ability to use the concept appropriately in the practice of giving and asking for reasons
and discerning one's commitments. Inferences of this sort are not logical inferences,
which is to say that the practice of making inferences is not limited to those beings
who have some logical mastery. Restricting the domain of inference-making to logical
discourses involves treating the above inferences as enthymematic; invalid until sup-
plemented with appropriate conditionals. \Edinburgh is east of Glasgow" can only be
validly inferred from \Glasgow is west of Edinburgh" with the additional premiss \For
all x; y [if x is east of y then y is west of x]. Similarly, the conditionals \For all x [if x
is red (and monochromatic) then x is not green]" and \If it is raining then the ground
will be wet" are required to make the second and third inferences formally valid re-
spectively. For the semantic inferentialist, material inference is fundamental, logical
vocabulary (paradigmatically the conditional) is a means of making explicit the in-
ferential relations that we endorse in practice (and, if one should so desire, inferential
relations that we do not endorse). Explicit logical competence is not a prerequisite for
inferential competence; there can be discursive practices that are not logical practices,
but logical vocabulary is a means by which we can codify our discursive practices. By
making explicit the inferences we could otherwise only adhere to in practice, logical
vocabulary allows us to lay bare our inferential commitments, bringing them under
rational scrutiny in a way that would not be otherwise possible. Material inferences
are non-monotonic; supplementary or collateral premisses can turn good material in-
ferences into bad ones. `It is raining outside, therefore the ground will be wet' is a
good inference, but `It is raining outside and the ground is covered with tarpaulin,
therefore the ground will be wet' is a bad one. `It is raining outside and the ground
is covered with tarpaulin and the tarpaulin has been perforated, therefore the ground
will be wet' is, on the other hand, a good inference.
The content of a belief is constituted by the material relations it stands in to other
beliefs. These relations can be classied into three fundamental kinds: commitment-
preservation; entitlement-preservation and incompatibility. A proposition p preserves
commitment to a proposition q, if commitment to p requires commitment to q. The
proposition `That is a vixen' preserves commitment to `That is a fox', for anyone
who is committed to the rst is thereby committed to the second. A proposition p
preserves entitlement to a proposition q if commitment and entitlement to p provides
prima facie entitlement to q. A person committed and entitled to the proposition `It
is raining outside' is thereby prima facie entitled to the proposition `The ground will
be wet'. Finally, a proposition p is incompatible with a proposition q just in case, if
a person is entitled to p then she is not entitled to q. A commitment to `The paint is
red (and monochromatic)' precludes commitment to `The paint is green'.
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Importantly for our purposes, semantic inferentialism involves a broad conception
of what can play a role in material inference. The `inferential' connections relevant to
the content of a concept involve not only connections between separate propositions
but also between their circumstances and consequences of application:
[T]he broad conception includes the possibility of noninferential circum-
stances and consequences of application. In this way ... the specically
empirical conceptual content that concepts exhibit in virtue of their con-
nection to language entries in perception and the specically practical
conceptual content that concepts exhibit in virtue of their connection to
language exists in action are incorporated into the inferentialist picture.
Conceiving such inferences broadly means conceiving them as involving
those circumstances and consequences, as well as the connection between
them. [Brandom 1994: 131]
Inferential connections in this broad sense include not just connections between
propositions but also aerent connections|the input of stimuli, reliable dierential
responses to kinds of objects|and eerent connections|the agent's actions. Part of
what constitutes our concept of redness is red perceptions (the other part is how these
red perceptions are integrated into a network of relations of commitment-preservation,
entitlement-preservation and incompatibility). Brandom calls the view that this broad
inferential articulation is sucient to determine conceptual content `strong inferen-
tialism'. This is the view developed and defended by Brandom. `Hyperinferentialism'
holds that the inferential connexions that obtain between propositions are sucient to
determine content. Finally, `weak inferentialism' is the view that inferential relations
are a necessary constituent of conceptual content, but not sucient. On weak infer-
entialism, if two contents were involved in dierent inferential connections, including
behaviours, they would have dierent meanings in virtue of this fact.
SI's applicability to the EAAN is probably becoming clear. Recall that it is via
(1**) that (1*) is motivated and, hence, (1) itself is justied. (1**) is supposed to be
plausible on the naturalist view because the role of a belief and its content can come
apart. On SI however, the content of a belief is, perforce, relevant to its content; for
what a belief does and what a belief is are two sides of the same semantic coin. It is
only in virtue of possessing the right sort of content that a belief could contribute to
tness. On SI the justication for (1**) is undercut.5 The EAAN gains its cogency
from the claim that, according to naturalism, there is no principled function from the
behavioural role of belief states to their contents, or that, even if there is, one has no
means of specifying this function or supposing that it associates adaptive behaviours
with true beliefs. SI however involves the claim that there is a principled way in which
contents are associated with behaviours, and species what this association is. This
complicates the picture for the defender of the EAAN; she can no longer suppose from
the outset that, given naturalism, there is no more reason to hold any behaviourally
felicitous belief to be true than false, for SI holds that to specify the inferential role
of a belief just is to articulate its content.
3 Responses
3.1 Incorrect?
Of course, the simplest response for the defender of the EAAN is to deny SI. It is, after
all, a minority view; most of the theorists who earn a living thinking hard about these
issues reject SI, presumably because they believe it to face insuperable objections. In
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this case the defender of the EAAN may still be warranted in holding that P(R/N&E)
is low even if they take it that P(R/N&E&SI) is high. The argument would lose some
of its scope, but, perhaps, none of its force. Naturalists, on the other hand, may nd
themselves more favourably disposed towards semantic inferentialism, were they to
hold that it constituted a response (perhaps the only compelling one) to the EAAN.
Even this simple response may not be straightforward. All that is required for the
challenge of SI is the `weak' variety in which having inferential relations of such and
such a sort is necessary for having a content of such and such a sort. On weak semantic
inferentialism (1**) remains unavailable as a justication for (1*).
3.2 Improbable?
It may be thought that SI itself is simply unlikely given naturalism and evolution.
In this case the total probability of (R/N&E) would have to take into account the
probability of R given N&E&SI and the probability of R given N&E&:SI, which
would be weighted by the probabilities of SI given N&E and :SI given N&E. Hence
the total probability of reliability given naturalism and evolution would be equal to:
[P(R/N&E&SI)  P(SI/N&E)] + [P(R/N&E& :SI)  P(:SI/N&E)]
But since SI is an a priori thesis stating a (purported) conceptually necessary truth,
P(SI/N&E) would be equal to 1 and P(R/N&E& :SI)  P(:SI/N&E) would not be
well dened. This strategy would make no advance; the total P(R/N&E) would have
to be taken as equal to P(R/N&E&SI).
3.3 Incompatible?
A more promising route would be to deny that SI could have a bearing on P(R/N&E)
because SI is itself incompatible with materialism. On the materialist picture there
are, presumably, either physical laws or metaphysical necessities governing what con-
tents would be associated with which NP structures, and hence determining the func-
tion f : NP 7! C. In this case there is a lawlike connection between NP properties and
belief contents, but no prima facie reason to think that this would map appropriate
contents to roles. Given what we know about materialism, it may turn out to be the
case that every content determined by an NP structure is `1+2=7'. If this were so
it would be a metaphysical necessity that every belief possessed by anyone was false,
and hence the metaphysical probability for any given belief that it is true would be 0.
One ought then to think of the EAAN as making a claim about epistemic probability;
on naturalism and evolution, for any given belief, the epistemic probability that is is
true is .5.6
But now SI looks to be incompatible with materialism, or, more carefully, it is
epistemically probable that SI is incompatible with materialism. For SI holds that a
belief has its content in virtue of the inferential role it plays, but it is epistemically
probable that a nal materialist theory of content will not associate contents with
belief in this way. If one accepts SI and the conclusion that materialism entails that
there need not be any principled connection between a belief's role and its content
then one is already rationally obliged to give up materialism. Plantinga however
intends the EAAN to apply equally to naturalistic dualism. On naturalistic dualism
there is a function h: M 7! C from states of non-material minds to contents, and
again the same considerations apply. Plantinga holds that it is unlikely that h will
associate true beliefs with adaptive causal roles:
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It isn't as if, as in theism, the person in question has been created in the
image of a God one of whose outstanding characteristics is knowledge and
understanding. [Plantinga 2008: 50]
But semantic inferentialism undermines (1**) in the dualist case for exactly the same
reasons as in the materialist case. As such, even if SI is incompatible with materialism
on naturalistic dualism the motivation to think that P(R/N&E) is low is still undercut.
3.4 Inconclusive?
Even though (1**) is sucient for (1*) it may not be necessary for (1*). If the
defender of the EAAN could motivate (1*) whilst accepting that (1**) is false, then
the EAAN would be on very strong ground indeed. This task though would not be
straightforward, for there is some reason to believe, on the SI picture of content, that
our interactions with the world|indeed the kind of interactions that are required for
behaviour to be adaptive|will structure the contents of our beliefs in such a way that
they will have a good chance of being true:
The way the world is, constrains proprieties of inferential, doxastic, and
practical commitment in a straightforward way from within those prac-
tices. So if I perceive a liquid as tasting sour, infer that it is an acid,
infer further that it will therefore turn litmus paper red, and, intending
to match a red pigment sample, accordingly dip litmus paper in the liq-
uid, I may nonetheless subsequently acquire perceptually a commitment
to the result being a blue, rather than red, piece of paper, and hence an
acknowledgement of my practical failure. In this way I can nd myself
with incompatible commitments (which need to be sorted out if I am to
remain entitled to any of my commitments in the vicinity). The possi-
bility of incompatible commitments arising from the cycle of perception,
inference, action, and perception reects the way the normative structure
of perception and action incorporates elements of the causal order. As
a result, empirical and practical contraints get built into what commit-
ments (including inferential commitments) one can sustain entitlement to.
[Brandom 1994: 332-3]
To defend the EAAN in this manner, it must be argued that there are many dierent
ways to be behave adaptively, many dierent networks of belief whose content can
be thus constrained by the cycle of perception, inference, action and perception, but
which still dier in widespread and signicant ways.
In a dierent context Angus Menuge makes a suggestion that may be adopted to
motivate a claim of this sort. Menuge draws an analogy between theoretical instru-
mentalism and psychological instrumentalism. The leading idea is this: just as there
are indenitely many theories that save the phenomena|that account for the data|
so too there are indenitely many networks of belief that `save the phenomena'|i.e.
that produce the adaptive behaviours in response to sense perceptions. Moreover,
just as most instrumentally or empirically adequate theories are largely false, so too
most psychologically or behaviourally adequate networks of belief are largely false.
[G]iven that there are a nite number of data points (stimuli and re-
sponses), and supposing that these exhaust the stimuli that a creature
can observe and the responses it can produce, the basic lesson of Theoret-
ical Instrumentalism remains. There are vastly more false mental model
8
that cover these data points than there are accurate (or nearly accurate)
ones. Therefore it is much more likely that psychologically instrumental-
ist models will be available for selection than psychologically realist ones.
[Menuge 2003: 161]
Matters are not straightforward however. Note that if SI is true, it is not the case
that there are dierent belief systems compatible with exactly the same inputs and
behavioural responses. This is because for any belief, no matter how recondite, there
are some scenarios in which it can inuence behaviour. Those who believe that
paradoxes of self-reference can be captured by the Inclosure Schema behave dierently,
in the seminar room, that those who do not. Given SI, there is no way to sunder beliefs
into those that pertain to action and perception and those that do not, as one might
divide the entities quantied over by a theory into those that are observable and those
that are not. As such, it is not the case that two distinct networks of belief could be
behaviourally identical.
Nevertheless, a range of dierent networks of belief could be suciently behaviourally
felicitous to have survived Darwinian pressures. The question then becomes whether,
given SI+N+E, we are likely to have beliefs that, whilst behaviourally felicitous, are
cognitively disastrous. It is certainly the case that a network of beliefs could be
predominantly false whilst possessing these properties. Again in a dierent context,
Plantinga considers a naturalistic scenario in which cognitive agents who describe
everything using Russellian denite descriptions of the form `the creature, such that
....' where creaturehood entails being created by God. On seeing a tree with red
foliage, instead of believing `The tree has red foliage' they believe `The creature such
that it is a tree has red foliage'. These agents' beliefs are largely false (remember, in
this scenario, naturalism is true), yet adaptive and compatible with our inferentialist
considerations. Yet, whatever the proportion of the beliefs these agents possess are
false, it would be wrong to think of this as a cognitive disaster ; as a really damaging
kind of scepticism. In fact, it is not importantly dierent from situations we may
well take ourselves to be in. Perhaps, for example, mereological nihilism is true, and
macro-objects do not really exist. In this case, a huge proportion of our beliefs will
be (strictly) false, just as a huge proportion of the beliefs held by the denizens of
Plantinga's scenario are false. But we do not, and ought not, think of this as a perni-
cious sceptical scenario akin to deception by an evil demon or ensconcement of one's
brain in a vat. It is incumbent on the defender of the EAAN to show that, given
naturalism, cognitive disaster is likely.
The diculty here is, as Plantinga's example illustrates, that cognitive disaster,
and the avoidance of cognitive disaster, cannot be simply parsed in terms of the
proportion of one's beliefs which are true or false. A dierent way to think about
avoiding cognitive disaster, in the spirit of SI, is to think of our beliefs as embody-
ing an understanding of the world. The agents in Plantinga's scenario possess an
(imperfect) understanding of their world that is not captured in terms of the truth
or falsity of their beliefs, but can plausibly be captured in terms of their grip of the
modal/nomic/dispositional structure of aspects of their world. Our interactions with
the world, through the cycle of perception, inference, action and perception, are able
to structure the content of our beliefs. When this process goes aright, the normative
structure of one's beliefs|the network of commitments and entitlements, what one
is entitled or committed to infer from what|tracks the modal/nomic/dispositional
structure of the world. This is not to say that our minds become a mirror of nature,
but rather that they embody an understanding of the world by tracking (some of) its
modal/nomic/dispositional properties.
Why is this signicant? According to SI, the content of one's beliefs is articulated
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by its inferential structure. Given SI then, grasping the modal/nomic/dispositional
character of objects or collections of objects just is having a network of beliefs
whose normative structure tracks the modal/nomic/dispositional of the world. Yet,
if one's network of beliefs is constrained by cycles of perception, inference, action
and perception then it is probable, and perhaps necessary, that it will possess a
normative structure that tracks aspects of the modal/nomic structure of the world
to at least some signicant extent. If then avoiding cognitive disaster is a case of
grasping the modal/nomic/dispositional character of objects or collections of objects,
then cycles of perception, inference, action and perception will structure one's be-
liefs in such a way that they avoid cognitive disaster. To put things the other way
around: if a network of beliefs does not possess an inferential structure that tracks
the modal/nomic/dispositional structure of the world to at least some signicant ex-
tent, then it will not be behaviourally felicitous. By contraposition then, if a network
of beliefs is behaviourally felicitous then it will possess an inferential structure that
does track the modal/nomic/dispositional of the world to at least some signicant
extent. On SI, this is what possessing an understanding of the world would consist
in. In brief, tracking the counterfactual nature of things around us is necessary for
behavioural felicitousness and sucient to avoid cognitive disaster. There is then, at
least prima facie reason to think that (1) would be dicult to motivate, given SI;
but the preceding account of cognitive disaster and its relationship to behavioural
felicitousness is merely a sketch.7 Settling the issue would involve wading further into
the deep and dicult territory of what constitutes a cognitive disaster. The challenge
semantic inferentialism poses is the demand that such a task be undertaken.
Notes
1The argument was originally presented in Plantinga [1991], and has since undertaken a number
of renements; cf. esp. Plantinga [1993, 2000, 2002, 2008, 2012].
2In what follows I will talk about NP properties `determining' contents to denote both the reduc-
tive claim that NP properties are contents and the non-reductive claim that contents supervene on
NP properties.
3Cf. esp. Dretske [1988, 1995].
4Cf. esp. Millikan [1984, 1989].
5In this way SI diers from other broadly functionalist theories of content. `Generic functionalism',
as Plantinga calls it, is the claim that what makes a neural structure or state N a belief and a belief
with a particular content is that N plays a particular causal role. On generic functionalism, instead of
there being a function f : NP 7! C from Boolean combinations of suciently complex NP properties
to contents, there is a function g: R 7! C from causal roles to contents. As Plantinga [2011: 452]
points out, this `doesn't seem to place any constraints at all on the content enjoyed by [the neural
structure that exemplies that causal role]'. There is nothing to say that g associates adaptive
roles with true contents; that further claim is not part of functionalism per se. Plantinga's response
however cannot be brought to bear on SI, since according to SI the role a belief plays constitutes its
content.
6Plantinga in fact takes the EAAN to be making a claim about metaphysical probabilities; yet,
because of the way Plantinga understands materialism, we cannot coherently understand the ar-
gument this way. One option here is adopt a materialism that involves contingent psychophysical
laws rather than reduction or strong supervenience. Plantinga however notes that the EAAN can
be carried out in terms of epistemic possibility. What we are considering here is that for it to apply
to all forms of materialism, the EAAN not only can but must be carried out in terms of epistemic
possibility.
7Some authors (Crisp [2011], Otte [2011] and Rea [2002]) have suggested a weaker version of
the EAAN which applies, not to all beliefs, but to some proper subset of them. The sketch above
pertained most obviously to quotidian beliefs about what Austin called \medium-sized dry goods",
and it is not immediately obvious whether or not it could extend to recherche metaphysical beliefs.
It may be that whilst P(R/N&E) is not low in general given SI, it is low for beliefs that are
not so immediately subject to the constraints imposed by cycles of perception, inference, action
and perception; e.g. recherche metaphysical beliefs. If naturalism is to be counted amongst one's
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recherche metaphysical beliefs, then the EAAN would still succeed. To motivate this, the defender
of the EAAN would have to contend that our inferential practices are not well suited to matters
metaphysical. Note that given Plantinga's motivation for (1), there is no reason to draw a distinction
between recherche metaphysical beliefs and quotidian ones, but that, given SI, it may be the case
that a restricted version of (1) could be motivated whilst (1) could not.
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